Because consumer discrimination can reduce productivity, it is often impossible to tell whether differential productivity is the effect of discrimination or of differential ability. Detailed data for the sports labor market make it possible to separate consumer discrimination from ability. We use a unique approach to determine whether the entertainment value of baseball players is related to their race: we examine whether race directly affects the value of a player in the market for baseball cards. In contrast to studies that use salaries, there is no room for owner or coworker discrimination. Our evidence supports the hypothesis of consumer discrimination.
I. INTRODUCTION
Economists have long attempted to explain the persistent wage gap between blacks and whites. The usual practice is to specify an empirical model that relates earnings to individual characteristics, such as education, training, experience, and age, in an attempt to control for productivity differences across individuals. Remaining differences in earnings between races are attributed to discrimination.' If the residual wage gap between races is accepted as evidence of racial discrimination in labor markets, the question arises: what type of discrimination? Becker [1971] identified three principal sources of discrimination: discrimination by employers, Association, Kahn and Sherer [1988] find a 20 percent wage gap between blacks and whites, holding constant measures of performance. Kahn and Sherer reject employer or coworker discrimination as the source of the wage gap, because buy-outs by nondiscriminators or segregation by firm should reduce these sources of discrimination. Furthermore, Kahn and Sherer find strong circumstantial evidence that the wage gap results from customer discrimination: basketball attendance is strongly and positively related to the proportion of team members who are white, holding constant other factors.
Kahn and Sherer's evidence of consumer discrimination is suggestive, but indirect. Other evidence, although casual, suggests that discrimination indeed exists in the sports labor market. For example, it is widely believed that white sports heroes receive far more offers for endorsements than black sports heroes of equal ability. ' In this paper we use an unusual approach to determine whether the entertainment value of baseball players is related to their race. Previous studies, such as that of Kahn and Sherer and recent work on discrimination in baseball [Raimondo, 1983; Hill and Spellman, 1984] , focus primarily on salaries. By contrast, we examine whether race directly affects the entertainment value of a player in the market for baseball cards. We ask whether a player's race affects the price consumers pay for a given card. Advantages of studying this market rather than players' salaries are as follows: (1) the data are readily available; and (2) in contrast to players' contracts, which are often complex documents containing performance clauses, the prices of baseball cards are measured with comparatively little error. In contrast to studies of salaries, the link between consumer racial attitudes and the price of baseball cards is direct. There is no room for owner or coworker discrimination.
II. THE BASEBALL CARD MARKET
The defining characteristic of collectors is a serious interest in baseball. The market for baseball cards has long ceased to be the domain solely of children. Most serious collectors are adults. [October 18, 1988] argued that "black athletes must be more famous, more accomplished, and more personable than their white counterparts to make it in the endorsement business."
An unnamed individual quoted in a recent Wall Street Journal

Children have not bid the price of a near-mint 1952 Mickey Mantle
Topps baseball card to $6,000 and the price of a near-mint 1952 Willie Mays Topps baseball card to $900. 5 Although baseball cards are still sold in bubble gum packages, they are also sold in large packages, often as complete sets or as subsets. There are thousands of full-and part-time dealers, clubs, and conventions.
Although some small regional price differences persist, the market for used and new cards is national. Beckett's Official 1989 Price Guide to Baseball Cards has set the standard for price guides in the hobby, and was therefore chosen as our source for prices. 6 The supply of a particular card is a fixed quantity. In general, the older the card, the rarer the card. For old cards this rarity is a combination of smaller initial production and greater deterioration of the existing stock of cards. Indeed, it is difficult to find top-condition cards for some years. In preliminary regressions not reported below, we entered each player's year of debut as a control variable. We expected year of debut to positively affect the card price. Because there were no cases in which debut year was either significant or caused our other results to change materially, we dropped this variable from the analysis.
Despite the errors in the measurement of player performance, the estimates of the effect of race on card price will be unbiased as 13. The league batting and slugging averages were .284 and .397 for Ken Williams, but only .248 and .365 for Billy Williams.
14. For example, the batting performance of two players in different years can be compared by comparing the ratio of each player's average to the mean batting average in that year. long as these errors are uncorrelated with race. None of the factors discussed above should affect players of one race more than another.
A wide variety of measures of performance can be used as explanatory variables. Summary measures that attempt to rank players by using a single number are computed from basic statistics such as singles, doubles, triples, home runs, walks, and so on. Because these indexes impose econometric restrictions that may be rejected by the data, we rejected the single-index approach in favor of entering each of the rudimentary statistics as explanatory variables. This procedure allows the data to speak as to how card collectors value a given measure of performance. The raw statistics are collected from the Macmillan Baseball Encyclopedia (seventh edition).
IV. EMPIRICAL FRAMEWORK
A. The Common Player
Although the price of baseball cards is related to the entertainment value of a player, most baseball cards sell at what is called the "common player" price. The price of the common player is the minimum value a card can take, and is unrelated to the performance of the player. Even the worst player's card commands a positive price because it has intrinsic value as a card.
As we mentioned earlier, card sets issued before 1974 were issued in series throughout the baseball season. Later series, issued when interest in baseball cards had waned, therefore tend to be rarer and command higher prices. Table I shows the common player prices and frequencies in our sample. Six series of cards were issued in 1970. Common player prices range from $0.20 to $1.50. About 70 percent of the hitters and 80 percent of the pitchers sell at the common player price, which introduces a censored dependent variable problem. The next section shows how we correct for this problem.
B. The Model
Assume that the utility that fans receive from a player's lifetime performance, V, is linearly related to a vector of the player's characteristics, X:
(1) V = 11'X, where the vector X includes both the player's performance and race. We wish to determine whether V is significantly affected by the player's race. It is not possible to observe V, and so estimate (1) directly. Although one alternative is to replace V with the player's card price, there is no observable effect of player's performance on card price for the players who sell at the common player price, despite significant performance differences. Rather than conclude that V is the same for these players, we assume that each card has a positive intrinsic value, and that the value of the card is not related to performance at low levels of performance.' Let P be the log dollar price of a baseball card. We assume that P is equal to the sum of two independent components: Position dummies were entered for first base, second base, third base, shortstop, and catcher; the omitted category was outfield. 16 Expected signs on the coefficients are shown in parentheses. Summary statistics for hitters' statistics appear in Table II. The estimated coefficients on race will be unbiased indicators of consumer discrimination as long as the race variables are uncorrelated with omitted variables that measure the athletic prowess of the players. The variables included in equation (6) include most variables considered to be important by fans and analysts of baseball. We believe that it is unlikely that there are any important omitted variables that are correlated with race.
Two omissions may provoke some controversy: runs scored and runs-batted-in. These measures are redundant because players who have many walks, singles, doubles, triples, and home runs will score and bat in large numbers of runs. Runs-batted-in and runs scored are highly correlated with singles, doubles, triples, and home runs. Holding constant these other variables, more runs-batted-in and runs scored indicate principally the quality of the hitters surrounding the player in the lineup. We did not, therefore, include those variables in our basic measure of player quality. 17 16. The expected signs on the position dummies are as follows: first base ( -); second base ( + ); shortstop ( + ); third base ( + ); and catcher (+ ), all relative to the omitted category, outfield. The position dummies partly measure the effect of fielding ability. We lacked sufficient degrees of freedom to undertake a full analysis of the contribution of fielding ability to card prices.
17. Some observers believe that runs-batted-in are a good indicator of "clutch" performance, and that players with large totals are those who come through in We estimated equation (6) using tobit, reported in column 1 of Table III .' The coefficients all entered as expected. Players with more hits, doubles, triples, and home runs sold for higher prices. Holding hitting performance constant, the more at-bats or seasons that it took to accomplish the feat, the lower the price of the card. Stolen bases entered positively, but not significantly. ' We first estimated a version of equation (6) in which we combined blacks and Hispanics into a single category, NON-WHITE. The resulting tobit regression is reported in column 1 of Table III . Approximating the normal distribution 4) with the sample proportion of cards that sold for more than the common price (31.4 percent), its coefficient implied that nonwhites sold for about 10 percent less than whites of comparable ability. 20 It is noteworthy that the differences in card prices due to race were in the same range as racial differences in earnings found using variations of the log earnings model. 20. Note that coefficients in the tobit regression do not measure a (P -Pc )/ax, but awax. Rather, a (P -PP ) /ax= 4, (3X) awax, where 1( ) is the value of the cumulative normal distribution function, which is the probability that a player sells for more than the common player price. *P -Pc is the log card price minus the log price of the common player. EXP (P -Pc ) is the unlogged card price divided by the price of the common player. STAR is the proportion of players with a card price greater than the price of the common player, that is, with P -Pc > O.
When separate dummy variables were defined for blacks and
17 percent less, than otherwise comparable white players. The null hypothesis of equal coefficients could be rejected at about the 7 percent level using a log likelihood (chi-square) test, with a chi-square of 3.38.
One worry with respect to the empirical findings in Table III is the role of outliers. A glance at Table I indicates that several players sell for tremendously high prices. The question arises whether customer discrimination is pervasive throughout the ability distribution or whether the results are driven largely by the superstar end of the market. We therefore also estimated a probit model in which the dependent variable was whether a player sold for more than the Table III . 21 The dependent variable was STAR, where STAR equals one if the player's card sold for more than the common player price, and zero otherwise. The regression with nonwhites combined into a single category indicates that nonwhites sold for significantly less than otherwise comparable white hitters. We next divided nonwhites into blacks and Hispanics. The race coefficient for Hispanics was significantly less than zero. Although the race coefficient for blacks was negative, it was not significantly different from zero at conventional levels of statistical significance (t = 1.2).22 It was, however, easy to reject the null hypothesis of equal race coefficients at better than the 1 percent level (chi-square = 11.64).
D. Pitchers
We specified the following equation for pitchers: 22. The effect of race on the marginal probability of being a STAR is given by Vi3" where V is the density function of the standard normal distribution and 13, is the estimated race coefficient. implies a lower performance level, the opposite is true for WALKS, HITS, and EARNED RUNS. The net effect of INNINGS PITCHED is therefore ambiguous.
Summary statistics for pitchers appear in Table IV . As with hitters, nonwhite pitchers had better overall statistics measured by career wins, saves, earned runs, complete games, and strikeouts. Nonwhites also pitched far more innings on average over the span of their careers.
Tobit estimates of equation (7) are reported in Table V . The Note. 233 observations. Asymptotic t-ratios are in parentheses. *P -Pc is the log card price minus the log price of the common player. STAR is the proportion of players with a card price greater than the price of the common player, that is, with P -Pc > O. **SIGMA is the estimated standard error of the regression.
estimated coefficients all had the expected signs, with the exception of WALKS, which entered positively and marginally significantly. The estimated coefficients on the race variables were all negative. We look first at the results in column 1, where blacks and Hispanics were combined into a single category, NONWHITE. The results indicated that nonwhites sold for 13 percent less than otherwise comparable whites, where we approximated (I) with the sample mean (19 percent of pitchers sold for more than the common price). The results in column 2 indicated that cards featuring blacks sold for about 16 percent less, and those featuring Hispanics for about 12 percent less, than otherwise comparable white pitchers' cards. Despite the considerable differences in the point estimates of the effect of race, a log likelihood test did not reject the null hypothesis of equal race coefficients for blacks and Hispanics at conventional levels of statistical significance.
To determine whether the negative effect of being black or Hispanic existed throughout the ability distribution or only at the superstar end of the market, we ran probit regressions for the pitchers, where the dependent variable was STAR (which is equal to one if a card sold for more than the common player price, and zero otherwise). When blacks and Hispanics were combined into a single category, NONWHITE, the estimated coefficient on NON-WHITE was statistically significant at the 5 percent level (t = 2.0). When blacks and Hispanics were separated, the t-statistics on each of the race variables were insignificant at conventional levels (0.8 and 1.3 for blacks and Hispanics). In contrast to hitters, statistically significant differences in consumer attitudes toward black versus Hispanic pitchers were visible only at the superstar end of the market: we could not reject the null hypothesis of equal race coefficients. The lack of statistical significance on the individual probit race coefficients is not surprising, given that there were only 13 black and 13 Hispanic pitchers.
The effect of being nonwhite on the card price of pitchers was somewhat greater than for hitters (13 percent versus 10 percent). The stronger effect of race in the pitcher regression seems plausible. The pitcher is central and the most visible player in a baseball game. As Becker [1971] suggested, customer discrimination against nonwhites should be greater, the greater the degree of personal contact with customers. We suggest that discrimination may be greater, the more visible the player. 
V. COMPARISON WITH STUDIES OF SALARY DISCRIMINATION
23
In results not reported here, we found that functional form and the choice of explanatory variables may be important determinants of the sign and significance of race variables in studies of discrimination. Because single index measures of player performance impose econometric restrictions, they must be chosen with care. 24 In the absence of strong theoretical reasons for imposing restrictions on the importance of each component of performance, we thought that it was preferable to "let the data speak." In the course of our investigation, we found evidence, albeit indirect, that the restrictions imposed by the use of single-index measures of performance may have contributed to others' failure to find discrimination among hitters.25 Future research is necessary to resolve this issue.
23. Raimondo and Hill and Spellman concluded that the introduction of free agency in baseball led to the difference between their results and Scully's; according to them, free agency caused racial discrimination in baseball to vanish within a decade. The implicit assumption in recent explanations for the disappearance of racial discrimination in baseball is that salary differences were caused by employer discrimination. Scully's earlier study, however, implied that consumer discrimination was the factor driving baseball players' salaries. Scully reported that, prior to integration, "Baseball management was concerned that attendance would decline with the introduction of Negro players" 
TOTAL BASES is defined as HITS + DOUBLES + (2 x TRIPLES) + (3 x HOME RUNS). RUNS CREATED is defined as [(HITS + WALKS) x TOTAL BASES]/(AT BATS + WALKS). It is not surpris-
ing that these indexes performed nearly as well as our specification; they are basically Our results indicate that consumer discrimination exists in the market for baseball cards. Among hitters, the cards of nonwhites sell for about 10 percent less than the cards of white players of comparable ability, whereas among pitchers, there is a 13 percent discount on nonwhites. We admit that this is a small market and that baseball cards are not a commodity purchased by most households. 26 Sports, however, are an important part of the entertainment industry. The collector of baseball cards is part of the larger group of sports fans and, if anything, is better informed than the typical fan. We therefore believe that our results do have some implications for the general problem of consumer discrimination. The lack of personal contact in the market is also significant. Race enters only as a picture on a piece of cardboard, and should, therefore, have minimal effect. The absence of personal contact should reduce the potential for consumer discrimination. That it does not eliminate it may be our most important result.
Becker predicted that racial consumer discrimination would be more likely in markets where personal contact is prevalent. In such markets the effects of discrimination often cannot be measured separately from the pure capability of the worker. If such measurements were possible, we believe that they would show that consumer discrimination makes race a more important contributor to the continuing wage gap than the studies of employer and coworker discrimination imply.
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